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A MISSING PIECE TO THE DIVIDEND PUZZLE: 
AGENCY COSTS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
Mitchell L. Engler* 
INTRODUCTION 
Serving to distribute corporate profits to the residual business 
owners, corporate dividends to shareholders might appear imsurprising 
at first glance. Deeper analysis, however, has left observers puzzled by 
the persistence over time of substantial dividend distributions by public 
corporations, in light of the tax burden of this method of income 
distribution and the existence of feasible alternatives. In lieu of 
dividends, public corporations have the option of either (i) retaining 
earnings or (ii) using profits to repurchase a portion of their stock on the 
market. In either case, those shareholders who desire their profits share 
in cash could sell some of their stock—and, for several reasons, both 
options could result in significantly reduced tax costs.' First, stock sales 
generally are taxed only to the extent the sales proceeds exceed the 
purchase price of the sold stock.^ Related thereto, a loss arises when 
stock is sold for less than its original purchase price, which might 
reduce tax on other income. Second, those shareholders who do not 
desire cash (non-sellers) remain unphased, avoiding any current tax.^ 
Finally, until this year's tax change, domestic investors generally paid 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
This paper was presented at (i) the Association of American Law Schools, Business Associations 
Panel (Annual Meeting, January 2003) and (ii) the Heyman Center for Corporate Govemance, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 1 thank the participants at these presentations, David 
Carlson, Terry Chorvat, Elia Fischer, Jeanne Schroeder, Paul Shupaek, Linda Sugin, Chuck 
Yablon, and Ed Zelinsky for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 The stock could be sold back to the corporation, in the case of a repurchase, or to others. 
2 Under the dividend altemative, the full dividend amount must generally be reported. Some 
investors, such as tax-exempt institutions, do not bear any dividend tax costs. Nonetheless, 
dividends have generated substantial tax costs given the significant number of taxable 
stockholders. See discussion infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
2 As discussed below, shareholders are taxed on dividends even where such dividends are 
reinvested in the same corporation. 
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tax at a higher rate on dividends than on stock sale "capital gains.'"* 
Attempting to account for this peculiarity of continued heavy 
dividend distributions, many commentators have attempted to explain 
their presence over time. As discussed below, however, the existing 
literature more convincingly explains the decision to distribute profits 
than the preference of dividends over share repurchases. Thus, the 
dividend puzzle remains. 
After further describing the dividend puzzle through a detailed 
comparison of dividends, retained earnings, and share repurchases in 
Section I, this Article makes two new contributions to the dividend 
analysis. In Section II, a new explanation is provided for the dividend 
puzzle. This descriptive claim connects two discrete strands of 
scholarship: the special impact on stock price by institutional investors 
and the agency costs of the mutual fund investment vehicle. On the one 
hand, mutual fund managers generally help guide corporate managers to 
the most efficient corporate policies. On the other hand, mutual fund 
managers largely ignore their investors' tax costs. As a result, corporate 
managers inadequately weigh the dividend tax cost to the ultimate 
shareholders in the corporation. 
This Article then recommends, in Section III, a normative proposal 
consisting of a new withholding tax on mutual funds as a response to 
the described market failure on investors' taxes. Without substantively 
changing the amount of tax on mutual fund investments,^ this proposal 
would better align the tax interests of fund managers and their investors. 
Currently, investors pay taxes on each fund investment from their 
general assets; accordingly, taxes paid on a particular fund investment 
do not automatically reduce the assets invested with such fund. Since 
the manager's fee is based on the fund's asset size, an unfortunate 
disconnect arises between the investors and their manager. Taxes 
automatically reduce the investors' profits but not the manager's fee.^ 
The proposed withholding tax implicitly addresses this agency 
problem: A mutual fund would, in effect, pay each investor's tax on his 
behalf from assets invested with the fund.^ The proposal therefore 
^ The recent tax bill—the Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 2003 —reduced the 
dividend tax rate to the lower capital gains rate. See Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003). The tax rate differential nonetheless remains 
relevant when analyzing dividend policy in prior years. In addition, the dividend rate reduction is 
only temporary; it expires in year 2008. Also, as discussed in the text, dividends can raise taxes 
even without this rate differential. 
5 Avoiding substantive tax increases is especially important in the mutual fund context given 
their limited role as financial intermediaries. See discussion infra notes 101-04 and 
accompanying text. 
6 This is true for the overwhelming majority of investors who choose automatic reinvestment 
of mutual fund distributions. A very limited exception applies for the small number of investors 
who choose to receive fund distributions in cash. See discussion infra notes 107-08. 
1 See discussion infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text for a more technical analysis of 
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realigns the tax interests of the investors and their manager: taxes would 
automatically reduce both investment profits and the management fee. 
Accordingly, fund managers would have a new incentive to heed their 
investors' taxes. The proposal's impact is not limited to corporate 
dividend policy. It also favorably addresses previously-noted tax 
agency problems within mutual funds such as detrimental short-term 
trading by fund managers.^ Section III also discusses why the 
withholding tax is preferable to the recent Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") tax disclosure rules for mutual funds. 
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE DIVIDEND PUZZLE 
A. Dividends Versus Retained Earnings 
To help develop the issues, assume counterfactually that a 
corporation must either distribute dividends or retain all earnings (and 
ignore stock trading costs).^' Even with such limited options, any 
dividend payout initially appears irrational. Under the 
Miller/Modigliani dividend irrelevance theory, the decision between 
retained earnings and dividends is irrelevant absent tax and transaction 
costs.'® Dividend irrelevance arises since investors can achieve any 
desired payout through their own market transactions. For instance, 
assuming profit retention by the corporation, any shareholder could 
create a "home-grown" dividend by selling some stock." In the other 
direction, any shareholder could reverse a corporate distribution of 
profits by purchasing more stock with the cash proceeds. 
This neutrality shifts once taxes are introduced. The home-grown 
"dividend" option (in other words, retained earnings) becomes 
preferable on an after-tax basis. Consider first those "taxable" 
shareholderswho cash in their share of profits by selling some stock. 
the withholding tax mechanism and its practical effect. 
^ As discussed infra note 65 and accompanying text, such short-term trading deprives 
investors of the favorable long-term capital gains rate and accelerates taxes. 
' Transaction costs will be discussed in cormection with share repurchases. See, e.g., infra 
note 44. 
See Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares, 34 J. OF Bus. 411 (1961). 
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 650 (1984) (using "home-grown" terminology). 
D This would reverse the cash flow to such reinvesting shareholder. As discussed infra notes 
19-22 and accompanying text, differences would remain between the retained eamings and 
dividend options since dividends transfer cash out of the corporation. 
D "Tax-exempt" and "tax-deferred" shareholders do not face the tax costs discussed in the 
text. For a more detailed discussion of the significance of tax-exempt and tax-deferred investors, 
see discussion infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
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Their amount of taxable income would be reduced from the full cash 
proceeds to only the gain, if any, on the sold stock. Related thereto, 
stockholders would report a tax loss if their original purchase price for 
the sold stock exceeded the sales proceeds. Such loss might reduce the 
tax on other income. These benefits generally result since the cash 
proceeds would be received in the form ofa stock sale.''' In addition, 
u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  a  l o w e r  t a x  r a t e  g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i e d  t o  s t o c k  s a l e s . T h i s  
rate differential has been significant at various times, for example, a 20 
percent capital gains rate versus a 38 percent ordinary rate for a top-
bracket taxpayer in 2002.'^ Consider also the potential tax benefits to 
those shareholders who do not wish to cash in their profit share. Under 
the dividend alternative, such shareholders must pay the dividend tax 
even though they reinvest the dividend in the same corporation. Under 
the repurchase alternative, such shareholders generally would avoid any 
tax.'^ In sum, the increased tax efficiency of retained earnings calls into 
question dividend distributions.'^ 
In response to this inquiry, prior commentary suggests some non­
tax benefits of dividends. Consider four prominent justifications for 
I.R.C. § 1001 allows tax-free recovery of the stock's purchase price or "basis." The 
possibility of significantly less taxable income under the repurchase alternative is enhanced by the 
rule allowing a taxpayer to designate which shares have been sold (when the taxpayer holds 
shares purchased at different prices). 
The selling stockholder might have an offsetting amount of additional income in later years 
imder the repurchase alternative since the basis in the retained stock would be lower than under 
the dividend altemative. Even so, the taxpayer would benefit under time value of money 
principles since no interest is charged for the resulting tax deferral. In addition, the stockholder 
could avoid such later excess inclusion under the repurchase altemative by holding the stock until 
death. See l.R.C. § 1014 (2003) (resetting recipient's basis to the current fair market value). 
For an exception to the stock sale treatment (where the stock sale is deemed too similar to a 
dividend), see discussion infra note 32. 
'5 Stock sales qualify for lower capital gains provided the sold stock has been held beyond 
one year. See l.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222 (2003). As discussed supra note 4 and accompanying text, a 
recent tax bill reduced the dividend tax rate from the ordinary rate to the lower capital gains rate. 
The rate differential nonetheless remains relevant for purposes of evaluating dividend policy in 
prior years. In addition, as discussed supra note 4, the dividend rate reduction is set to expire in 
2008. Finally, as discussed supra note 14 and infra notes 17, 48 and accompanying text, 
dividends currently retain tax disadvantages even without a rate differential. 
'6 l.R.C. § 1 (2003). 
'7 Such shareholders would not sell any stock in connection with the repiu-chase, thereby 
avoiding any taxable transaction. For a limited exception, see discussion of l.R.C. § 305(c) infra 
note 32. 
' ^ Cf. Miller & Modigliani, supra note 10, at 432. 
One line of tax scholarship, known as the "new view," posits that the dividend tax cost has 
been greatly overstated. This follows when retained earnings are eventually distributed as 
dividends. The time value of money benefit imder retained earnings (deferral of the dividend tax) 
would be offset by the higher eventual dividend tax base. The new view has generally not been 
accepted, however, especially since repurchases can replace dividends and some dividends are 
reinvested in corporations See George Zodrow, On the "Traditional" and "New" Views of 
Dividend Taxation, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 497 (1991). See also the discussion infra Section l.B.l 
discussing the tax savings of repurchases over dividends. 
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dividend distributions. First, dividends arguably address the general 
corporate agency problem, in other words, the potential failure of 
corporate managers to pursue fully the interests of shareholders. 
Dividends arguably enhance the market's ability to discipline corporate 
managers by forcing corporations to seek new capital more frequently. 
Second, some corporations might earn a sub-optimal pretax return on 
retained earnings, thereby offsetting the tax savings.^" Related to the 
first two points, dividends arguably counteract "empire building" by 
corporate managers.^i Finally, dividends arguably add value by 
signaling management's confidence in the firm's prospects.22 
B. Dividends Versus Share Repurchases 
Section LA justified dividends under the counterfactual assumption 
that corporations otherwise would retain their profits. The dividend 
puzzle is restored, however, given the third actual alternative of stock 
repurchases by corporations. Section I.B.I provides the basics of the 
puzzle, briefly discussing how share repurchases initially appear to 
provide (i) comparable non-tax benefits over retained earnings, plus (ii) 
the more favorable tax treatment accorded stock sales. Section 1.B.2 
shows how the puzzle remains even after a deeper analysis recaps some 
potential advantages of dividends over repurchases. 
Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 652-55. More frequent capital issuances can impose 
additional discipline through, inter alia, the scrutiny of underwriters and the threat of reduced 
proceeds on the new capital issuances. Dividends also might address the more specific agency 
problem of management's excess risk-aversion (due to managers' lack of diversification in 
human capital). Risk-averse managers might excessively retain earnings to cushion against the 
possibility of a failed enterprise. As a result, the debt-equity ratio falls, causing a wealth transfer 
from equity holders to debt holders. Dividends can address this agency cost decline to 
shareholder wealth in two ways. First, dividends by themselves increase the debt/equity ratio. 
Second, as discussed in the text, dividends can generate new capital issuances. This can further 
restore the optimal debt/equity ratio given the possible issuance of new debt. Id. 
20 Id. at 650 (stating that dividends make sense for "a change in investment policy-when, for 
example,. . . shareholders can make better use of the money than managers"). This assumes that 
the corporation is not simultaneously issuing new equity. 
As a related tax point, corporations which retain eamings beyond the reasonable needs of 
the business could become subject to the accumulated eamings tax. (The accumulated eamings 
tax is a dividend-substitute tax imposed at the corporate level.) See I.R.C §§ 531-37 (2003). For 
a discussion downplaying the risks of such tax for public companies, see RICHARD BREALEY & 
STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 434 (5th ed. 1996); Fischer Black, The 
Dividend Puzzle, J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5 (1976). 
21 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender 
Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 438-39 (2000). 
22 See, e.g., Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Signalling with Dividends, Stock 
Repurchases, and Equity Issues, FiN. MGMT. 27, 35 (1986) (explaining that dividends distinguish 
the more profitable firms capable of generating the cash needed to pay dividends). For a critique 
of the dividend signaling theory, see infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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1. Initial Restoration of the Dividend Puzzle 
Share repurchases generally can be divided into open-market 
repurchases and repurchase tender offers.^^ An open-market repurchase 
involves the purchase by a corporation of its stock on the market at the 
prevailing price. The repurchase tender offer involves a bid by the 
corporation to purchase a number of its shares, typically at a significant 
premium to the current price. In considering repurchases as a dividend 
alternative, the following discussion focuses on the less costly open-
market repurchases.24 
The dividend puzzle arises since repurchases also transfer 
corporate profits to shareholders, but in the more tax-ffiendly form of a 
stock sale. The similar transfer of profits to shareholders suggests 
initially that repurchases could match the non-tax benefits of dividends 
over retained earnings. The cash outflow from repurchases similarly 
could (i) generate more frequent issuances of new capital,^^ (ii) stem the 
accumulation of excess capital inside the corporation,^^ and (iii) signal 
undervaluation of the corporation to the market.^^ Furthermore, by 
adjusting the number of shares acquired, a corporation generally could 
make any desired level of cash distribution.^^ 
23 A relatively minor percentage of corporate repurchases take the form of targeted 
repurchases from a select shareholder (for example, greenmail). Michael J. Barclay & Clifford 
W. Smith Jr., Corporate Payout Policy: Cash Dividends versus Open-Market Repurchases, 22 J. 
OF FIN. ECON. 61, 61-62 (1988). 
24 See Justin Pettit, Is a Share Buyback Right for Your Company?, 79 HARV. BUS. REV. 141 
(2001); see also Fried, supra note 21 (noting lower transaction costs for open market repurchases 
and therefore analyzing what reasons might support use of a repurchase tender offer over an open 
market repurchase). 
25 In positing the agency cost explanation for dividends, Judge Easterbrook stated that 
"nothing ... suggests that repurchases of shares would not do as well or better than dividends." 
Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 655; see also Zodrow, supra note 18, at 507 (stating that dividends 
continue to puzzle "since share repurchases provide a means of... limiting managerial discretion 
that results in a much smaller tax cost"). 
26 See F.H. Buckley, When the Medium is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 
IND. L. J. 493, 519-21 (1990) (noting how both repurchases and dividends enhance value where 
shareholders would cam a superior rate of retum on the corporate retained earnings). As a related 
point, share repurchases similarly would reduce any accumulated eamings tax concerns. See 
discussion of the accumulated eamings tax supra note 20. 
27 For the comparable signaling potential of repurchases, see Laurie Simon Bagwell & John 
B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Shareholders, 3 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 129, 135 (1989), stating 
that "signaling models explain cash payout more satisfactorily than they explain the choice 
between dividends and [share] repurchase[s]", and Zodrow, supra note 18, at 507, explaining that 
justifying dividends is especially "problematic since share repurchases provide a means of 
signalling profitability . .. that results in a much smaller tax cost than that incurred with the 
paying of dividends." For a deeper analysis of how dividends and repurchases might send 
different signals, see infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. 
28 Assume Y Corporation has 100 shares outstanding, valued at $10 per share. Y Corporation 
is plaiming a dividend distribution of $100, in other words, $1 per share. In lieu of such dividend, 
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On the tax side, repurchases generally are more efficient than 
dividends since repurchases take the form of a stock sale. Similar to the 
retained earnings analysis above, selling shareholders potentially benefit 
from a lower amount of taxable income and, until recently, a lower tax 
rate. In addition, non-selling shareholders benefit from the lack of any 
tax inclusion.29 
2. Puzzle Remains Even After Deeper Analysis 
Probing deeper, existing commentary provides some potential 
benefits of dividends over repurchases. As discussed below, however, 
recent dividend levels appear inexplicably high even after such potential 
advantages are taken into account.^" 
Dividends have potential benefits over repurchases in two primary. 
Y Corporation could distribute $100 by purchasing 10 shares (10 shares x $10 = $100). At first 
blush, a shareholder might appear to receive a materially different treatment under the two 
alternatives. Consider a stockholder (S) who owns 10 shares of stock. Under the dividend 
alternative, S receives $10 in addition to retaining the ten shares. Under the repurchase 
alternative, retention of all ten shares would foreclose any cash receipt, in other words, S decides 
not to sell any stock. Under certain assumptions, however, S's stock will be worth $10 more 
under the repurchase altemative since the stock price should decline by approximately $1 per 
share imder the dividend altemative, in other words, an amount equal to the per share distribution. 
Thus, if S desired $10 cash, S could sell one share. If so, S would have $10 cash and $90 stock 
imder either altemative. While the $1 stock decline might not occur under the dividend 
altemative (perhaps due to the factors discussed above, for example, signaling), the repurchase 
altemative could experience a similar favorable reaction in stock price as well. See, e.g., 
discussion infra note 39 (discussing how stock price can increase on the annoimcement of a 
repurehase); see also discussion infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing potential 
wealth shifts). 
The SEC's safe harbor exemption from tender offer regulation does impose some limits on 
open-market repiuchases. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
29 Consider the earlier example supra note 28. Under the repurchase altemative, selling 
stockholders would be taxed only on the excess of the $10 sales price over their purchase price 
for the sold stock. Furthermore, such gain might qualify for a lower capital gains rate. In 
contrast, tmder the dividend altemative, all shareholders would have a taxable dividend of $1 per 
share. In addition, imtil the recent tax change, the dividend would have been taxed at the higher, 
ordinary tax rate. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for the significance of the rate 
differential. The exeess tax cost becomes more dramatic if the dividend distribution assumes 
some reinvestment through a dividend reinvestment plan ("DRIP"). See infra note 43 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of DRIPs. For instance, assuming a reinvestment of $20, the 
taxable dividend amount in the aggregate would be $100, despite the net distribution of only $80. 
In favorable contrast, the repurchase distribution could be limited to 8 shares to match the $80 net 
distribution. This would generate an aggregate shareholder tax inclusion of only $80 less the 
aggregate purchase price of the sold shares (again, with the additional possible benefit of a lower 
capital gains rate). This assumes that the repurchase would not be recharacterized as a dividend 
by the IRS. See discussion infra note 32. In addition, some tax-exempt shareholders would not 
bear any tax costs regardless of the form (and a limited number of shareholders might have a tax 
preference for dividends over repurchases). See discussion infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
30 While repurchases have increased over time, corporations still collectively pay significant 
dividends. See discussion infra note 49. 
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interrelated areas: regularity and wealth shifts. Corporate dividends 
typically are distributed at fixed intervals over time. The potential 
advantages of such regularity relate primarily to the signaling function, 
a policy of regular, ongoing distributions arguably sends a stronger 
signal of profitability to the market.^' 
Repurchase regularity might be hampered by two factors. First, 
regularity would increase the risk that the repurchases would be treated 
as dividends for tax purposes, especially, if accompanied by a public 
announcement (for signaling purposes).Second, die potential wealth 
31 A regular dividend policy might suggest management's confidence that the profitahility 
will continue over time and/or willingness hy management to regularly share profits in lieu of 
empire building. For the arguable superiority of dividend signaling due to such regularity, see, 
for example, Asquith & Mullins, supra note 22, at 36-37, explaining that dividends have distinct 
signaling benefit due to more regular fi-equency. The lack of legal constraints on subsequent 
reductions to a declared dividend policy arguably undercuts, however, such potential superiority 
of dividends. On the one hand, legal constraints against dividend reductions arguably are not 
needed since the marketplace harshly penalizes dividend reductions. This market-based argt^ent, 
however, better explains steady dividends over retained earnings than the choice of dividends 
over redemptions. That is, market forces similarly could encourage corporations to redeem stock 
on a semi-regular basis, even if such corporations avoided formal statements as to a regular 
redemption policy for the reasons discussed below in the text. See also the critique of dividend 
signaling infra note 40. 
Separately, some investors might like a steady income stream. As discussed above, 
however, investors can create their own desired pattem of cash flow independent of fee 
corporation's distribution scheme. Furthermore, this point loses force when considering 
investment through mutual funds, the ultimate focus of this Article. As discussed infra note 107 
and accompanying text, most mutual fund investors automatically reinvest dividends passed 
through to them by the fund. As a related point, some investors arguably might prefer dividends 
based on the irrational belief that dividends provide a higher pretax yield than repurchases since 
the stockholder receives cash without relinquishing any stoek. This point similarly loses force in 
the mutual fund context since professional money managers should not succumb to such fallacy. 
See also discussion supra note 28. 
32 Technically, share repurchases will not receive the more favorable sales treatment if they 
are deemed too similar to dividends under Intemal Revenue Code section 302. If so, sales 
proceeds from repurchases would be treated as dividends to the sellers. In addition, non-selling 
shareholders could be treated as receiving a fictional taxable stock dividend (explaining their 
increased ownership in the firm). See I.R.C. § 305(c) (2003); Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7 (2003). 
Intemal Revenue Code section 302 generally has not been viewed as a significant impediment to 
favorable tax treatment for public company redemptions, however. See Bagwell & Shoven, supra 
note 27, at 136 (explaining how firms have leamed over time how frequently they can do 
redemptions without mnning afoul of Intemal Revenue Code section 302); Barclay & Smith, 
supra note 23, at 63, 69 (stating that Intemal Revenue Code section 302 has not been problematic 
for public corporations; furthermore, risks are more likely for repurchase tender offers than open-
market repurchases); Zodrow, supra note 18. There probably are some limitations on complete 
substitution of repurchases for dividends. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 20, at 431 
(speculating that the IRS might go after a firm that eliminates dividends in favor of a regular 
repurchasing program); Asquith & Mullins, supra note 22, at 36 (predicting an IRS response if 
many firms regularly substituted repurchases for dividends); Buckley, supra note 26, at 517. 
Even so, the question remains why corporations have not pushed the issue more, especially since 
the IRS might have a difficult enforcement issue in collecting from the myriad public 
shareholders. Compare the decision to relax the "shareholder continuity" mles whereby sales by 
public shareholders after a business combination might affect the tax-free status of such 
combination. 
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shift under a repurchase arguably impedes regular repurchases. 
Dividends distribute cash pro rata based on shareholdings, and, do not, 
by themselves, change each stockholder's percentage share ownership. 
In contrast, only selling shareholders receive cash under the repurchase; 
correspondingly, the percentage ownership of the non-selling 
shareholders increases." In effect, non-selling shareholders implicitly 
purchase stock from selling shareholders at the repurchase price paid by 
the corporation." As such, wealth is shifted from the non-sellers to the 
sellers where the stock price is overvalued at repurchase." In addition 
to raising possible concerns in its own right,^^ this potential wealth shift 
arguably impedes regular repurchases.^^ For instance, corporate 
managers' self interest might block repurchases when they believe the 
33 A pro rata distribution would require the sale by each shareholder of a pro rata portion of 
the repurchased stock. See discussion infra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining how 
management tends not to sell in connection with the repurchases). In the unlikely event of a pro 
rata distribution, a sale back to the company would be treated as a dividend for tax purposes. See 
discussion of Internal Revenue Code section 302 supra note 32. At least in form, a shareholder 
can avoid such issue by selling stock to someone other than the corporation. 
3'! For simplicity, assume X Corporation has only two shares outstanding, one owned by A 
and one by B. Assume X Corporation repurchases A's share for $100. This is analogous to a 
purchase by B of A's share for $100. In either case, B would own all the shares in X 
Corporation. While B would avoid the direct $100 payment under the repurchase scenario, the 
cash in B's wholly-owned corporation would decline by $100. 
33 Similarly, wealth is shifted from sellers to non-sellers where the stock is undervalued. It 
has been suggested that open-market repurchases generally benefit non-selling shareholders while 
premium tender offers tend to benefit selling shareholders. See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment 
of Shareholders, 71 CAL, L. REV. 1072, 1084 n.28 (1983). This presumably follows from the 
higher purchase price on self-tenders due to the premium. 
36 For a normative argument that repurchases generally should be prohibited due to these 
wealth shifts, see Brudney, supra note 35, at 1106-13, expressing particular concern on wealth 
shifts in favor of insiders. Several dividend explanations rely on this possible costly shift in value 
between selling and non-selling shareholders under the repurchase alternative. See, e.g., Barclay 
& Smith, supra note 23; Michael J. Breiman & Anjan Thakor, Shareholder Preferences and 
Dividend Policy, 45 J. OF FiN. 993 (1990); Deborah J. Lucas & Robert L. McDonald, Shareholder 
Heterogeneity, Adverse Selection, and Payout Policy, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 233 
(1998). Dividends continue to puzzle commentators despite these attempted explanations. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGAINZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 384 n. 54 (8th ed. 2002) (characterizing one such attempted 
explanation as seemingly trivial); FRANKLIN ALLEN ET AL., A THEORY OF DIVIDENDS BASED ON 
TAX CLIENTELES, (Rodney L. White Center for Research Working Paper, 1998) (discussing gaps 
in each such explanation); Buckley, supra note 26, at 546 ("[bjecause open-market repurchases 
are made at market price, distributional concerns are negligible"). While repurchases do raise 
some legal issues, they "ordinarily seem likely to be small in relation to the potential tax 
advantages of [repurchases] " KLEIN & COFFEE, supra, at 384. 
As a related point, avoidance of the need to make periodic decisions might be another 
potential reason why dividends are advantageous to shareholders. In response, however, just like 
a shareholder could decide at the time of investment to reinvest all dividends through a DRIP—if 
available, a shareholder could decide ab initio to consistently respond whenever the corporation 
repurchases at the current market price, that is, to either always or never tender depending on 
whether the shareholder wants periodic liquidations of the investment. Furthermore, this point 
loses force in the context of investments through mutual fimds, the ultimate focus of this Article. 
In such context, investors hire fund managers to oversee and manage the investment portfolio. 
37 See Lucas & MacDonald, supra note 36. 
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stock is overvalued since managers typically do not sell in connection 
with the repurchase.38 Regularity and wealth shifts, however, do not 
satisfactorily explain the significant dividend levels over time. First, 
despite its irregularity, arguably, the repurchase is a superior signal than 
the dividend in other respects. The above discussion highlights a 
potential self-enforcing mechanism of repurchases. If management 
holds stock and does not sell in connection with the repurchase, 
management implicitly purchases from the selling shareholders. 
Arguably, management would not initiate a repurchase absent a belief 
of stock undervaluation. This is especially true when the repurchase is 
announced in advance since the stock price tends to increase on si^h 
announcement.39 jn contrast, the dividend signal has been critiqued for 
the lack of any such self-enforcing mechanism.^o 
This signaling analysis also provides at least a partial response to 
the more general wealth shift concern. If the repurchase accurately 
38 As discussed below, repurchases can send a positive signal to the market. This signaling 
function is undercut where management participates in the buyback. See Pettit, supra note 24, at 
143 Separate from their self-interest, corporate managers might be reluctant to favor selling 
shareholders over those continuing their current investment with the corporation. Compare 
Jeffrey N Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets. Costly Information, and Securtties 
Research 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 820 n.l58 (1985) (for the related explanation of why the stock 
price generally falls on a new stock issuance (management, acting for current shareholders, wou d 
be reluctant to issue stock when it believes the firm's assets are undervalued by the market)). 
As discussed infra note 43, the non-tax differences between repurchases and dividends 
narrow once the dividend is coupled with a DRIP. In this regard, query (i) whether the marke 
should respond negatively to the dividend/DRIP combination where inanagenient does not 
repurchase under the DRIP, and (ii) if so, why that does not impede regular dividendDRIPs. 
39 Buckley, supra note 26. In order to avoid the implicit purchase at an excess pnce, t e 
stock must be undervalued at the announcement time to allow for the expected increase pnor <) 
repurchase. As an aside, an overvalued repurchase can harm non-selling management under the 
asLmption that the stock price eventually will reflect their more negative \ 
argument that repurchases are stronger signals than dividends, see id., at 539-40. Although 
Professor Buckley focuses specifically on the premium self-tender at this point in his discussion 
his analysis applies as well to open-market repurchases ("OMR s). As Professor Buckley 
discusses, the signaling strength comes from the combination of a premium and the lack of 
tendering by management. While the OMR lacks the full premium, the announcernent of an 
OMR tends to increase the stock price, as discussed above. Furthermore, even without sue 
increase, there would be a shift in wealth away from non-selling management if the stock price 
were overvalued. The OMR therefore can be a stronger signal than a dividend, which lacks the 
implicit purchase by management at the repurchase price. As discussed infra note 43, the non-tax 
differences between dividends and repurchases narrow when the dividend is coupled with a 
DRIP In this regard, query whether a dividend with a DRIP sends a comparable signal if 
management reinvests the dividends. The self-tender with a premium can be an even stronger 
signal than the OMR since the non-sellers are purchasing at an even higher, committed pnce. 
40 See. e.g., Bernard S. Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutionall^estpr 
Voice 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 838 (1992) ("[S]ome companies pay dividends they can't afford in 
an effort to fool investors about their profitability.... Dividend cuts also often lag far behipd 
business reversals."); Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 652 ("[D]ividends do not distinguish well-
managed, prospering firms from others."); see also Pettit, supra note 24 (explaining that 
institutional investors are unlikely to be swayed by dividend signaling). But see discussion supra 
note 38 (discussing where the dividend is coupled with a DRIP). 
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signals, it minimizes wealth shifts by reducing stock price 
undervaluation."'! In this regard, consider also the SEC's safe harbor 
exemption from tender offer regulation for small amounts of open-
market repurchases, on grounds that "issuer repurchase programs are 
seldom undertaken with improper intent.""'^ Furthermore, wealth shifts 
can occur even in connection with (pro rata) dividends. Consider, for 
example, the coupling of a dividend with a dividend reinvestment plan 
("DRIP"), pursuant to which only some shareholders reinvest the 
dividend in new corporate stock.''^ In sum, any non-tax benefits of 
dividends over repurchases are significantly narrowed relative to the 
initial presentation at the beginning of this Section."'"' 
See Buckley, supra note 26, at 513, 541 n.l73, for this explanation. See generally 
Buckley, supra note 26, at 502 ("[T]here is little likelihood of shareholder expropriation when the 
repurchase is made at market price.") and 546 (explaining that there are "negligible" 
distributional concerns on open market repurchases). 
42 Exchange Act Release No. 19,244 [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T] 
83,276, at 85,478 (Nov. 17, 1982). 
43 Once a DRIP is introduced, the differences between repinchases and dividends generally 
narrow. In other words, shareholders who reinvest dividends are analogous to non-selling 
shareholders under the repurchase alternative. (DRIPs differ in that they typically provide a 
discount to the ctirrent trading price. As such, a more equivalent repurchase alternative would 
require a repurchase at a price below the current stock price. Nonetheless, as discussed below, 
similarities remain, for example, a structure which shifts wealth among shareholders—at least in 
the mind of management— when they believe the stock price stock inadequately reflects its true 
value.) For a discussion about the prevalence of DRIPs, see, for example, BREALEY & MYERS, 
supra note 20, at 419. The DRIP possibility highlights how new stock issuances more generally 
raise similar wealth shift concerns. New stock issuances similarly force current shareholders to 
decide whether to retain their current ownership percentage. 
A final wealth shift point involves taxes. As discussed below, shareholders bear 
disproportionate dividend tax costs based on their specific tax profiles. Dividends thus generate 
wealth shifts between shareholders on an after-tax basis. It has been argued that these tax 
differences should be ignored by corporate managers since (i) the eost is shareholder specific and 
(ii) heavily-taxed shareholders can avoid stocks with high dividend levels. See Brudney, supra 
note 35. This position appeals more under certain market assumptions; for example, where 
taxable shareholders (i) can sell stock upon an increase in dividend policy without any costs 
(including taxes), (ii) fully understand the tax implications, and (iii) need not sacrifice 
diversification in pursuit of tax-friendly stocks. For deviations from such assumptions, however, 
see for example, the discussions of (i) the tax clientele theory infra notes 47-48 and 
accompanying text, and (ii) the mutual fund tax agency problem infra notes 64-67 and 
accompanying text. A position that shareholder taxes are irrelevant even absent such market 
conditions suggests a prohibition of repurchases even where desired, on balance, by a more 
finely-tuned market (for example, where shareholders' excess dividend tax costs dominate any 
excess repurchase costs to the corporation). See also Brudney, supra note 35 (proposing 
limitations on repurchases to avoid corporate-level costs). Recognition of the imperfect market 
conditions does not, of course, resolve the difficult question as to management's appropriate 
balancing of shareholders' divergent tax interests. See also infra Section III.C (discussing the 
balancing by mutual fund managers). 
"*4 See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36, at 384 ("the costs associated with [the] legal 
problems [of redemptions] ordinarily seem likely to be small in relation to the potential tax 
advantages"); Barclay & Smith, supra note 23, at 67, 77 (explaining that it is unclear whether 
dividends or open-market repurchases dominate on the basis of out-of-pocket expenses, and 
therefore "out-of-pocket expenses incurred... [under either option] appear to be relatively 
small."); Black, supra note 20, at 6 (same); Zodrow, supra note 18, at 508 n.l2 (explaining that 
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Finally, the tax clientele theory also inadequately explains the 
dividend level over time. The tax clientele justification draws upon the 
fact that some shareholders do not bear any dividend tax costs, for 
example, tax-exempt and tax-deferred groups.'*^ Dividends therefore 
should be attractive to such investors so long as dividends have any net 
non-tax benefit over repurchases, even if relatively minor. Arguably, 
corporations distribute dividends to satisfy such shareholder base. As a 
related point, dividends might not impose excess tax costs since taxable 
investors can appropriately discount their reservation price for dividend-
paying stocks.46 Despite some descriptive power, the tax clientele 
theory has fallen short of solving the dividend puzzle.^^ The tax 
clientele theory has particular difficulty reconciling substantial 
dividends with a significant investor base that has home high dividend 
tax costs."*^ 
the SEC limits on open market repurchases are not likely to be burdensome). 
45 Tax-exempt and tax-deferred groups refer respectively to those who never pay tax and 
those for whom taxes are deferred until a later time. See discussion infra note 73 (discussing why 
tax-deferred retirement accounts, for example, pension funds, should be indifferent between the 
tax treatment of dividends and repurchases). 
46 For example, they can discount the price they are willing to pay for the stock by the excess 
tax costs. r- , Ti f 
47 See eg Dan S Dhaliwal, Merle Erickson, & Robert Trezevant, A Test of the Theory oj 
Tax Clienteles for Dividend Policies, NAT'L TAX J. 179, 179-80 (1999) (discussing how pnor 
tests failed to establish a strong enough link between tax status and die holding of dividen 
stocks). Possible reasons for the lack of such connection include a diversification desire and 
trading costs, including tax costs in selling stock. As discussed below, Dhaliwal Enckson and 
Trezevant provide support for the clientele theory but only by relying, in part, on the purchase of 
dividend-paying stocks by mutual fund managers (who represent taxable investors). 
48 In addition to taxable U.S. investors, foreign investors should prefer repurchases since 
foreigners generally pay no U.S. tax on capital gains while dividends are subject to a 30 P^^^nt 
withholding tax, subject to possible treaty protection. See also Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 652 
(explaining that the presence of substantial parties who are indifferent to dividend tax costs still 
does not explain the adoption of provisions which significantly harm others). Corporatmns 
owning portfolio stock in other corporations might have a tax preference for dividends since 
corporations (i) can exclude a portion of dividends under a "dividends received deduction and 
(ii) do not receive a lower capital gains rate on stocjc sales. Corporations appear, however, to be 
relatively minor players in the market for corporate stock. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36; 
iee also Black, supra note 20, at 6 ("[l]t is hard to believe that [corporate investors] have enough 
impact on the market to outweigh the effects of taxable individuals"). As a related point, there 
are clienteles for dividend-paying stocks for non-tax reasons. Certain financial institubons face 
legal restrictions against owning stocks which do not pay dividends. Trusts also might have a 
preference for dividends, characterized as spendable "income," rather than capital gams, viewed 
as "additions to principal." BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 20, at 429. See also ALLEN ET AL. 
supra note 36 (arguing that dividends reduce agency costs by attracting more institutional 
monitors). See also supra note 31 (discussing the regularity appeal of dividends). 
Notwithstanding the presence of some dividend clientele (for tax or other reasons), the question 
remains: "Why should so many investors want high [dividend] payouts?" BREALEY & MYERS, 
supra note 20, at 435. See supra note 47 (discussing the shortcomings of the tax clientele ^eory). 
See also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36, at 385, 385 n.57 (explaining that ^stees who hold 
dividend-paying stocks so as to generate income-as opposed to stock gain-"merely shift the 
inquiry, there being no satisfactory answer to the question of why those irrationalities persist[,] 
and asking "why do lawyers persist in failing to 'draft around [such restrictions] ). 
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In sum, the dividend level has remained substantial despite the 
increasing popularity of share repurchases over time The potential 
benefits of dividends over repurchases appear insufficient to fully 
explain the dividend level over time given the significant tax savings for 
numerous investors.This is especially so when analyzing dividend 
policy in recent years, prior to this year's elimination of the higher 
dividend tax rate.^i The dividend puzzle therefore is not the presence of 
any dividends, but rather the high level of issuance over time. 
II. MUTUAL FUND AGENCY PROBLEM - MISSING PIECE TO THE 
DIVIDEND PUZZLE? 
The previous Section explained why dividends remain puzzling. 
This Section suggests a new explanation for the persistence of tax-
inefficient dividends over time. As discussed below, the inattention of 
mutual fund managers to their investors' taxes has contributed to a 
market failure. 
Consider first the stock trading theory regarding the incentives for 
corporate managers to adopt the most efficient policies. If a corporation 
adopts an inefficient policy reducing shareholder value, its stock price 
should decline as investors take such harm into account. The fact that 
ordinary investors might lack knowledge, or imderstanding, of 
inefficient corporate policies does not vitiate this market discipline 
theory.52 institutional investors, due to their sophistication and large 
stakes, overcome such ordinary investor impediments.^^ Where 
inefficient provisions are adopted after the initial stock offering,^^ the 
49 For a discussion on the increased use of repurchases, see KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36; 
Pettit supra note 24; Zodrow, supra note 18; Floyd Norris, Growing Number of Companies 
Choose Not to Offer Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at Al. For a discussion of the 
continued high dividend level, see, for example, KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36, at 385, stating 
that "most major corporations continue to pay dividends."; Zodrow, supra note 18, at 507, Norris, 
supra stating "To be sure, most companies still pay dividends " 
50 See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36, at 385 (stating that there is "no satisfactory 
explanation" for the dividend level over time). See also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying 
text (regarding the possible superiority of repurchase signaling despite the lack of regularity; and 
authorities discussed supra note 48). See supra notes 13-18, 29 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the significant tax benefits. 
5' See supra note 4 for a discussion of the recent tax bill and its impact on the analysis of 
dividend policy. 
52 See. e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1428-34(1989). 
53 See, e.g., Gordon & Komhauser, supra note 38, at 802 ("Institutional investors hold a large 
percentage of assets traded on exchanges and represent an even larger proportion of those 
investors with portfolios of sufficient size to warrant substantial expenditures on research."). 
54 A similar concept applies to the initial issuance of stock as well. Professional investors 
help to set the market price on initial offering, with such market price based, in part, on the 
provisions in the corporate charter. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 52, at 1430-31. 
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resulting sell-off by institutional investors initiates a process under 
which the stock price declines to its new, lower equilibrium. Lower 
stock prices, or the threat thereof, can encourage corporate managers to 
adopt the most efficient policies due to, inter alia, possible additional 
capital issuances in the future,stock ownership by managers, and the 
market for corporate control.Importantly, this stock trading process 
maintains its general descriptive force despite the lack of absolute 
preeision in all cases. 
Consistent with the market incentive to reject inefficient corporate 
policies, many commentators have searched for offsetting benefits of 
dividends (or costs of repurchases) to explain the dividend persistence 
55 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 568-79 (1984) (describing various forms of market equilibration depending on the 
nature of the information). For a limited category of less sophisticated information, all market 
participants act collectively to set the new equilibrium (uniformly informed trading). For more 
sophisticated information, trading by market professionals set the new equilibnum, either alone 
(professionally informed trading) or in conjunction with subsequent trading by other investors 
who follow the lead of the market professionals (derivatively informed trading). 
56 This can be particularly relevant as to the profits distribution mechanism given the 
argument that the distribution's purpose is to place the company back in the new issuance market. 
See discussion supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
57 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 651 (stating that over time, firms with the most 
efficient terms will prosper relative to others). See also Barclay & Smith, supra^^ note 23 
("[Mjarket participants have strong incentives to devise efficient distribution methods. ). Other 
management incentives include the labor market for corporate managers, monitoring by creditors, 
bankruptcy risk, fiduciary duties (with corollary lawsuits), and cultural norms of behavior. Even 
if one questions the effectiveness of the stock trading discipline, a special role stilly can be 
recognized for institutional investors in shaping corporate policy through the exercise of Voice. 
See, e.g. Black, supra note 40, at 832 ("Capital market constraints are weak for firms that can 
service their debt and rarely sell new equity" since the other factors described above have 
weaknesses, for example, corporate control challenges are hampered by high premiunis and 
company defenses), 865 (implicitly assuming corporate managers will care about desires of large 
institutional investors), 887 ("institutional investors ...are the market"). The large voting blocks 
of instimtional investors can affect corporate policy through direct voting or dialogues with 
management. The voice approach might appeal as an alternative to the extent institutional 
shareholders face difficulties in selling their significant stake without driving down the price. As 
a related point, this might suggest an additional impediment to the stock trading approach. 
58 See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36, at 406 ("One can treat [the efficient capital 
market hypothesis] as an effective, practical, and useful view of the world despite an awareness of 
its departure from complete scientific accuracy."); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 551 
n 10 ("[E]ven if problems are finally resolved against current formulations of [the efficient capital 
market hypothesis], the 'basic insights of the efficient markets literature [would] still remain.'") 
(second alteration in original); Gordon & Komhauser, supra note 38, at 809 ("The modem 
finance paradigm may be 'wrong' but may nevertheless provide genuine insights into market 
function, particularly if it seems to organize experience more effectively than existing 
alternatives."). In particular, the component related to the influence of institutional investors has 
significant acceptance. For one article questioning the widespread use of the efficient market 
theory but nonetheless accepting the significant role of institutional investors, see Gordon & 
Komhauser, supra note 38, at 795, explaining that restricting research by large institutions could 
have "serious repercussions" for market efficiency. But see Jeffi-ey N. Gordon, What Enron 
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial 
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1236-40 (2002) (questioning the instimtional investor role 
in light of the Enron simation). 
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in the face of its tax disadvantage.^' As discussed in Section I, the 
current significant dividend level over time has been puzzling due to the 
meaningful tax benefits of repurchases.^® The current section 
approaches the dividend puzzle from another perspective. Drawing 
upon existing literature on mutual fund agency costs, this Section 
suggests that the dividend tax costs have not properly been taken into 
account by the marketplace. 
Mutual fund agency costs are analyzed primarily in the literature 
on the potential "voice" influence of institutional investors.®' 
Institutions might influence corporate policy through either voting or 
discussions with management, rather than through an "exit" approach of 
stock trading. While recognizing possible benefits to concentrated 
ownership by institutions on the one hand,®^ such scholarship highlights 
how institutions raise a second-tier agency problem in return. That is, 
the managers of the institutional investors might not fully pursue their 
beneficiaries' interests.®^ 
A previously-recognized manifestation of this agency slippage 
regards taxes and short-term trading by mutual fund managers. Mutual 
funds generally do not pay any tax at the fund level on their stock gains. 
Instead, investors in the fund pay tax on their pro rata share of the 
fund's stock gains.®^ Short-term trading by fund managers denies 
investors the lower capital gains rate and accelerates their taxes.®® 
Concern thus has been expressed over the tax harm to fund investors 
when fund managers frequently trade stocks, with apparent disregard of 
their investors' tax consequences.®® As discussed below, the lack of 
59 See discussion supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
60 See, e.g., supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
61 See, e.g.. Black, supra note 40; Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: 
Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (2002); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and 
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445 (1991). For a 
brief reference to the mutual fund agency problem in the context of efficient markets, see Gordon 
& Komhauser, supra note 38, at 805-06, which is discussed in greater detail infra note 80. 
62 Institutional investors might reduce agency costs at the operating corporate level by 
overcoming shareholder collective action impediments to voice discipline. E.g., Black, supra 
note 40; Rock, supra note 61. 
63 See, e.g.. Black, supra note 40, at 815, 817 (explaining that money managers need to watch 
themselves to ensure that they act in beneficiaries' best interests); Rock, supra note 61, at 452-53, 
454 n.29,469-78. 
64 Funds must distribute such stock gains to their investors to avoid an additional tax at the 
fund level. The investor-level tax is due even if the investor automatically reinvests all such 
distributions in the fund. See l.R.C. §§ 851-52 (2003). 
65 The lower rate applies only if the fund held the underlying stock for more than one year. 
For the harm from the acceleration of the tax payment on stock gains, see discussion of the 
benefits of interest-free tax deferral supra note 14. 
66 See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Disclosure of Mutual 
Fund After-Tax Retums, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7941.htm (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Tax Disclosure]; House Commerce Chairman Tom Bliley's 
Statement on Mutual Fund Tax Awareness Act of 1999, 2000 TNT 52-14 (3/16/2000) (discussing 
high portfolio turnover rate); Representative Paul Gillmor's amendment to Mutual Fund Tax 
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direct tax collections from mutual funds significantly contributes to this 
^®%SylTonnect the earlier theory on the market influence of 
professional investors^s and the agency costs of mutual funds As 
discussed above, mutual fund managers—a significant institutional 
investor group representing taxable investors^^-largely ignore their 
investors' tax costs on trading decisions-^" This reco^ized problem o 
short-term trading should extend, a fortiori, to the dividend/repurchase 
analysis as well,^i as mutual fund managers have largely neglected the 
potential tax savings of repurchases to their investors, falsely behaving 
as if they represent only tax-deferred investors. 
Awareness Act of 1999, 2000 TNT 52-34 (3/16/2000) (providing findings of Congress on high 
^°"fLTsc3on infra Section IlI.B.l. Another contributing factor to this agency 
that investors typically evaluate funds on a pretax. (2001). 
infra additional agency costs can arise when fund managers trade stocks for 
the Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 3 at 6 (discussmg such end-of-quarter winaow 
The tax analysis is more complicated than corporate governance provisions in that the to 
harm varies L each shareholder depending on its particular tax status, mile dividends do not 
IZ to exempror t^x-deferred shareholders, a taxable shareholder's afler-to return could be 
significantly reduced by dividends. Nonetheless, the market could 
wLre shareholders discount their reservation pnce by the particular harm to them, bee supra 
notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing the to clientele theory). For shortcomings i 
nractice however see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
69 While some mutual fund accounts are to-deferred retirement investments, mutual fm 
represent significant taxable investors. Approximately 40 percent of the 
mLal funds for individuals is through a taxable account. ' JjJ ^^^^ble 
discussion of the possible conflict where a mutual fund manager invests on behalf of both taxabl 
Nonetheless fund managers currently do not have the incentive to fully weigh investor toes as 
ma^y toesmrdo not Lertake the sophisticated after-tax analysis. the discussion infra 
dividends received by mutual tods generally are not 
taxed at the tod level. Rather, tod investors are taxed on their pro rata shwe. 
72 See discussion infra note 73 (explaining why tax-deferred accomte should be Je 
the to savings of repurchases). The textual point should be relaxed, but not elinunated to the 
extent tod managers pay some, but not full, attention to investor toes (in other words, they 
falsely behave as if they represent more tax-deferred investors than in actuality). See discussio 
5«pratoe 7a dividend-paying stocks by mutual tod 
managers asTuipotl to clientele theory of dividends. 
supra note 41. See a/io discussion rapra notes 45-46 and accompanying ex ( 
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While mutual funds also invest on behalf of tax-deferred 
investors," a significant amount of mutual fund assets are managed on 
behalf of taxable investors." By operating as if they represent only tax-
deferred investors, price-setting fund managers have skewed the 
market" in favor of tax-costly dividends." This is not to suggest that 
the diverse tax interests of fund investors are easily reconciled by fund 
managers." Rather, as a descriptive matter, fund managers have 
contributed to a market distortion by favoring the tax-deferred 
clientele theory's argument that the marketplace will neutralize dividend tax costs as dividend-
paying stoeks gravitate toward investors who do not bear dividend tax costs). The iromc 
inclusion of acquisitions by mutual fimds as support for the tax clientele theory was based on the 
assumption that mutual fund managers disregard investors' tax costs Dhaliwal, Enckson & 
Trezevant, supra note 47, at 182. See discussion sMpra notes 47-48 and accompanying text 
(explaining why the tax clientele theory inadequately explains the current dividend leve ). 
73 Tax-deferred investments such as qualified retirement accounts (for example, pensions) 
should be tax indifferent to the dividend/repurchase decision since neither option generates a 
current tax liability. No tax is due on the receipt of dividends or repurchase proceeds by the 
retirement account so long as the payout remains invested in the retirement account. Instead, the 
retirement beneficiary is taxable when funds are withdrawn from the retirement account. 
Furthermore, this was true even before the recent equalization of the dividend and capital gams 
rates since the ultimate withdrawals are taxable at ordinary rates regardless of whether the 
investment returns in the intervening years were ordinary income or f^ 
combination of tax deferral and the loss of any capital gams preference esteblish the tex 
indifference. In contrast, taxable mutual fund investors can be significantly harmed by the 
dividend decision given the pass-through tax status of mutual funds descnbed above^ 
Repurchases could reduce their tax bill for the reasons discussed supra notes 13-18 and 
Ksclosure, supra note 66, at n.l6 ("[A]lmost 40 percent of non-money market 
fund assets held by individuals ($2.1 trillion) were held in taxable accounts."). 
75 While the textual discussion focuses on the stock trading aspect, voice monitoring also 
might be skewed as institutional shareholders show greater uniformity on dividend^s (m other 
words a lack of concem on dividend tax costs) than their beneficianes. As discussed infra note 
115, the proposed mutual fund withholding tax could improve both stock trading and voice 
monitoring on the dividend/repurchase decision. ..... i • i.,a;ntT thp tax 
76 This is particularly problematic to the extent dividend analysis, including the to 
consequences, falls outside the realm of universally informed trading, as discussed supra note . 
If so institutional investors have a market pricing role above and beyond their own percentage 
interest. See supra note 55 (discussing of professionally informed and derivatively mfomed 
trading) Dividends seem likely to fall outside the realm of universally informed trading, 
especially since a comparison to the more to-ffiendly repurchase ^^mative ^ 
sophisticated financial interpretation. See Gilson & Kraakman, 5«pra note 55, a (p g 
analysis of technical accounting information in the professionally informed trading category), 
so the tendency of mutual fund managers to an act as if they represent solely tax-deferred 
investors is particular problematic since a second prominent institutional investor group--pension 
funds—already (correctly) act on a to-indifferent basis. Pnvate hedge fimds might provide some 
counterweight, although hedge fund managers also might fail to consider 
taxes. Expected tax agency slippage might be less for hedge funds giving the greater 
sophistication of the typical hedge fund investor. discussion infra note 81. Even if the tax 
consequences of dividends generated universally informed trading, there would sEl be a 
disconnect to the extent of the mutual fund's percentage interest. In addition there could be a 
representative distortion on the voice influence given the special voice role of institutions 
descntol a^iscussion Section III.C (addressing the difficulty of such task m the context of 
the proposed withholding to). 
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viewpoint to the neglect of their taxable investor clientele.''^ 
As a final point, the stock trading theory also helps to explain the 
persistence of fund manager tax neglect despite the ability of fund 
investors to withdraw their money from tax-inefficient fund managers.^^ 
As discussed above, the market typically relies on sophisticated 
institutional investors to drive out inefficiencies. Lacking size or 
sophistication, the typical mutual fund investor is not well equipped to 
discipline tax-inefficient fund managers.^® Despite the presence of 
some mutual fund investors who overcome such obstacles, the market 
inefficiency remains.^' 
In sum, this Section linked existing literature on how (i) 
professional investors provide the stock trading discipline on excess-
cost policies, and (ii) mutual funds present a two-tier agency problem. 
Interaction of the two suggests that dividend tax costs have been 
inadequately weighed by the marketplace. Such insufficient weighting 
78 Cf. Black, supra note 20, at 6 ("[I]t is hard to believe that [tax-exempt investors] have 
enough impact on the market to outweigh the effects of taxable individuals."). 
79 For an argument that individuals generally should have greater ease in monitoring mutual 
fund managers than corporate managers, see Black, supra note 40, at 851-52 (stating that mutual 
fund manager performance is easier to quantify than performance of corporate managers and 
individual investors have the collective ability to pull their money out of the fund). But for a 
discussion regarding the particular difficulties in evaluating fund managers on the more 
complicated afler-tax basis, see discussion infra note 80. 
89 See discussion supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing how the size and 
sophistication of institutional investors allows them to discipline at the underlying corporate 
level). Consider also the following quote from a comparable inquiry as to whether fund 
beneficiaries sufficiently regulate potentially wasteful researeh by institutional investors; 
The answer lies in the questionable ability of the beneficiaries of institutional 
investors to monitor performance [The market discipline approach] relies on the 
market to police such research activity; a manager pursuing inappropriate research 
activity would face, in theory, a decreasing pool of assets. Such policing presumes that 
investors will be able both to evaluate the disclosed data and to move assets among 
institutional investors. These presumptions may be open to question. For example, 
many mutual fund investors invest through such an intermediary precisely because 
they lack the necessary sophistication to evaluate performance except on crudest terms 
and their small stake makes it irrational to develop greater sophistication. 
Gordon & Komhauser, supra note 38, at 805-06. In this regard, evaluating fund managers on 
after-tax, rather than pretax, retums goes well beyond "crude." Even assuming an investor 
understands the importance of focusing on after-tax, rather than pretax retums, after-tax retums 
vary for each investor based on, inter alia, their marginal federal and state tax rates and how long 
they expect to hold their fund shares. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed discussion of these complexities. Along these lines, even a sawy investor might avoid 
such complicated analysis on grounds of rational apathy. See also the discussion infra note 125 
and accompanying text (explaining the perceived inability of fund investors to regulate the less 
complicated investment advisory fee stmcture); Palmiter, supra note 61, at 1482 (discussing how 
institutional investors led to liberation of closed-end funds premiums). 
81 See discussion supra note 70 (regarding the private market for after-tax information even 
prior to the SEC tax disclosure mles). As evidenced by the SEC's recognition of the general tax 
agency slippage, however, the market discipline approach has come up short due to an 
insufficient number of informed investors. In this regard, sophisticated individual investors with 
large stakes might utilize private hedge funds, rather than public mutual funds, as their financial 
intermediaries. 
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provides a new explanation for the inexplicably high dividend level 
over time. 
III. RESPONSE TO THE MARKET FAILURE - A MUTUAL FUND 
WITHHOLDING TAX 
Section II provided a new explanation for the dividend puzzle, 
mutual fund agency costs. As discussed therein, the agency slippage on 
dividends is part of a broader problem; the general neglect by fund 
managers of investors' taxes. The current Section proposes a new 
mutual fund withholding tax to address the more general problem.^^ As 
discussed below, such withholding tax therefore responds to both the 
previously recognized short-term trading problem and any remaining 
slippage on corporate distribution policy.^'^ 
This Section proceeds as follows. Section III.A briefly describes 
the proposal. Section III.B then analyzes the appeal of such proposal, 
including a comparison to the recent SEC tax disclosure rules. Section 
III.C addresses possible concerns under the proposal. 
82 Mutual fund agency costs do not, of course, provide a complete explanation for high 
dividend levels. Other factors contribute as well. See, e.g., supra notes 45-46 and accompanying 
text (discussing the impact of tax-exempt investors). In addition, path dependency also might be 
a contributing factor (for example, repurchases might be hampered by the market's familianty 
with dividends even as repurchases became relatively more attractive over time as markets 
developed and/or the relative tax advantages became more significant at particular times). 
Similarly the fact that dividends predate the current popularity of mutual funds does not undercut 
the mutual fund agency explanation for the dividend level in recent years. As suggested in this 
footnote there are a variety of contributing factors to the dividend level at any point m time (for 
example' the relative percentages of taxable and tax-exempt market participants, the development 
of an exchange market, etc.). The key point is that the dividend level would have been lower in 
recent years if fund managers had fully focused on investors' tax costs. 
83 This mutual fund withholding tax therefore differs from the current mutual fund 
withholding tax on foreign investors. See discussion infra note 104. 
84 Thus the proposal should be implemented even after taking into account the recent tax bill 
which (temporarily) reduced the dividend tax rate to the capital gains rate. First, as mentioned in 
the accompanying text and developed later in this Section, the proposed withholding tax does not 
specifically target the dividend/repurchase area. Rather, it addresses more generally the mutual 
fund tax agency problem. Second, as discussed supra note 4, dividends retain excess tox costs 
even after such legislation. While the tax rate cut reduces the tax disadvantage of dividends, 
failure to adequately weigh the remaining tax differences distorts the optimal dividend level. 
Note that shifting to a consumption tax might better address some, or all, of these concerns. 
Consideration of such major structural reform is beyond the scope of this article. For a more 
general analysis of the benefits of shifting to a consumption tax, see, for example, Mitchell L 
Engler, A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals: An Alternative Hybrid Approach, 54 
ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2003). 
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A. Description of the Proposal 
As briefly discussed above, mutual funds are generally treated as 
pass-through entities for tax purposes. Mutual funds generally do not 
pay any tax on corporate dividends or stock gains, provided that such 
amounts are distributed annually to their investors.^^ instead, investors 
must include such mutual fund distributions (as dividends or stock gam) 
on their own tax returns. Taxable investors thus pay tax on their pro 
rata share of a fund's corporate dividends and stock gains. In addition, 
taxable fund investors report gain or loss on the sale of the mutual fiin 
investment (after taking into account income already reported under the 
pass-through rules described above).®^ 
For reasons discussed below, this Article's proposal does not alter 
the fundamental pass-through nature of mutual fund taxation. Rather, 
mutual funds would be obligated to withhold taxes from distributions of 
either corporate dividends or stock gains to taxable investors.^^ Thus, 
withholding would not be required on qualified retirement accounts, 
which receive tax deferral treatment.^^ The mutual fund would transfer 
to the government the taxes withheld from taxable accounts on behalf of 
the taxable investors. Despite reduced distributions from mutual funds, 
an investor's tax liability would not increase since a credit would be 
allowed on the year-end tax return for the withheld amount. This 
treatment corresponds to the current withholding on wages by 
^ Two additional key points should be highlighted.^^ First, Ac 
withholding obligation would apply only to taxable events occurring 
"inside" the mutual fund, that is, the receipt by the fund of a corporate 
dividend or a stock sale by the fund. The withholding obligation would 
not apply to any additional tax owed on a liquidating sale of the mutual 
fund investment by an investor.'" The second point concerns the rate at 
85 See I.R.C. §§ 851-52 (2003). While this discussion focuses on the ownership of corporate 
stock by mutual funds, similar principles apply to the ownership of other investments such as debt 
Where the sale occurs in the middle of the year before a distribution date the holder does 
not report any share of the fund's current income not yet distnbuted. Instead, the fundholder 
would report additional gain (or less loss) on the redemption of the mutual fund interest itself. 
87 The withholding would occur at the time of the mutual fund distribution. 
88 5ee discussion supra note 73. 
89 More detailed issues to consider include the followmg; Would state taxes be wi'hh®'" 
addition to federal taxes? Would withholding apply to all assets owned by the mutual fund (e.g., 
debt instruments)? For the reasons discussed in this article, the withholding tax appeals 
irrespective of the resolution of these more detailed questions (although the answer to each is 
P^°90^j^g®g|^emption for liquidating distributions forestalls two possible objections to the 
withholding tax. Both relate to the fact that mutual funds currently must report to the IRS each 
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which taxes would be withheld by the funds. Investors would provide 
either (i) their prior year's marginal tax bracket each year, or (ii) their 
most recent marginal tax bracket at the time of the initial investment 
with the fund, subject to possible periodic updates.^i Absent significant 
complexity concerns, the more precise former alternative should be 
utilized.'^ 
B. Appeal of the Mutual Fund Withholding Tax 
The appeal of the mutual fund withholding tax proposal will be 
evidenced in two main ways. First, Section III.B.l highligks its kinship 
to prior scholarship demonstrating how a corporate-level tax addresses 
corporate-level agency tax problems. Then, Section III.B.2 then 
compares the withholding tax to the recent SEC tax disclosure rules for 
mutual funds. 
1. Kinship to Existing Corporate Tax Literature 
The mutual fund withholding tax proposal builds upon existing 
literature on the agency cost advantages of a corporate-level tax.^^ The 
corporate structure by itself presents an agency tax problem similar to 
that discussed above for mutual funds. Namely, corporate managers 
might make decisions with tax consequences that diverge from the 
after-tax interests of the corporation's shareholders. 
investor's share of taxable items triggered inside the fund but not the amount of liquidating gain 
(although the fact that there has been a liquidation is reported). The limited withholding 
minimizes (i) the incremental cost of the new regime, see discussion infra note 132 and 
accompanying text, and (ii) concerns that investors will have a tax disincentive to use funds see 
discussion infra note 106 and accompanying text. In addition, the exclusion of liquidating gains 
is consistent with the underlying reasons for the withholding tax. 
Periodic updating could be done either (i) at the investor's election (with reminders sent by 
the fund at year end) or (ii) mandatory every five years or so. Note that the original election 
would not limit the fund to withholding at the rate applicable at such time if the government later 
changes the rate structure. For example, taxes could be withheld at the current top rate fi-om 
someone providing an earlier top rate. See the discussion infra note 92 as to why absolute 
precision is unnecessary. 
Absolute precision is imnecessary because the correct tax ultimately will be reported 
regardless of the withheld amount. See discussion infra Section III.B.l. Furthermore, after the 
reeent shift of the dividend tax rate (to the capital gains rate), a higher percentage of mutual fund 
income would be taxed at the relatively fixed capital gains rate. Even a rough approximation 
would significantly improve the current status, under which mutual fund managers largely ignore 
investors' taxes. See discussion supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. 
93 The seminal article in this area is Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, 
and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991). See also Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity 
Tax and Corporate Integration: An Agency Cost Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions 
Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. I (1993). 
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Assume counterfactually that the corporation was treated as a pass-
through entity.^'^ If so, the corporation itself would not pay any tax on 
its profits. Instead, shareholders would pay tax on their pro rata share of 
corporate profits, based on their particular tax status. Prior scholarship 
highlights how such pass-through treatment would exacerbate agency 
tax problems. Placing the tax outside the corporation on each 
shareholder creates two possible agency cost deviations. First, stock-
owning managers would have an incentive to make tax-relevant 
corporate decisions (such as when to sell corporate assets) based on 
their own particular tax circumstances rather than the shareholder group 
at large.^5 Second, placing the tax outside the corporation increases the 
likelihood that corporate managers will inadequately consider the tax 
consequences of their decisions.'^ 
Agency tax costs therefore support imposing some portion of the 
tax on the corporation itself.^"' Arguably, a corporate-level tax at a rate 
independent of particular shareholders' tax status addresses both agency 
cost problems. First, a uniform corporate-level tax minimizes the self-
serving concern where the managers' tax rates differ from other 
shareholders.'^ Second, managers have a harder time ignoring a 
94 Under current law, corporations are taxed on their taxable income at the corporate level. 
I.R.C. § 11 (2003), Taxable shareholders then face a "second-level" tax on the receipt of 
dividends or the sale of stock at a profit. I.R.C. §§1, 61(a)(3), 61(a)(7) (2003). There is a limited 
exception to this "double tax" regime for Subchapter "S Corporations." See I.R.C. §§ 1361(a), 
1363(a) (2003). 
95 See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 93. 
96 See Snoe, supra note 93. 
97 See, e.g., Kanda & Levmore, supra note 93. Moving the full tax to the corporate level is 
hampered by the fact that different shareholders face different tax rates. The agency cost benefits 
of having the tax at the entity level must be balanced against the excess tax imposed on 
investments by tax-exempt (or lightly taxed) investors. In this regard, see infra notes 101-03 and 
accompanying text, for a discussion of the assumed high elasticity of the decision to invest 
through a mutual fund). 
98 See, e.g., Kanda & Levmore, supra note 93. A reduced version of the problem remains to 
the extent some portion of the tax is imposed at the shareholder level. For instance, the current 
tax regime raises such concerns regarding corporate distributions to shareholders. This raises the 
question as to why corporate managers have not substituted repurchases to a greater extent solely 
out of self interest. On the one hand, corporate managers appear to have incentives to substimte 
repurchases if they own stock (to reduce their own taxes on corporate distributions). Incentives 
also appear where managers hold options since repurchases generally lead to a greater spread 
between the stock price and the option exercise price, and hence the option's value, in the usual 
situation where (i) the option exercise price is not decreased for dividends and (ii) dividends 
reduce the stock price relative a repurchase. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 36. On the 
other hand, managers may have insider trading concerns or face other pressures not to sell stock 
under the repurchase alternative. In addition, some eorporate decision makers might have 
concems that their sales would be treated as dividends anyway under I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). The 
favorable ruling that a relatively small decline in the interest of a public company shareholder 
qualified for stock sale treatment applied to a non-management shareholder owning only 
.0001118 percent of the stock. Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92 . Resolution of this interesting 
question-in other words, why corporate managers have not substituted repurchases to a greater 
extent out of self interest-is beyond the focus of this Article. 
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corporate-level tax than a shareholder-level tax.^^ 
The withholding tax proposal builds upon the latter insight, making 
appropriate modifications. Despite the similarity of the agency tax 
concems for corporations and mutual funds,there is a material 
difference between the two entity forms. Corporations generally 
conduct real activities, whereas mutual funds serve as financial 
intermediaries.''" Accordingly, the proposal herein declines 
recommendation of an actual tax on mutual fimds themselves, like a 
corporate-level tax.'^^ This is due, in part, to concems that such a tax 
would unduly discourage use of the mutual fund intermediary. 
Fortunately, a mere withholding apparatus has real potential to 
address agency tax costs in the mutual flmd context. As a threshold 
matter, the limited withholding aspect addresses excessive tax concems 
since the proposed regime would not increase the tax liability of mutual 
fund investors. In contrast to the corporate tax, the proposed 
withholding tax would merely collect taxes otherwise due and payable 
by fund investors.'"'' Any acceleration in the payment date of mutual 
fund taxes generally should be minor.Furthermore, the benefits of 
99 Compare Snoe, supra note 93, at 16 (explaining that at the corporate level, "[t]axing the 
[corporate] entity forces the manager to consider the tax consequences of her decisions. 
Satisfying a tax obligation reduces the assets at her disposal...."). Even a loyal, diligent 
manager has difficulty taking shareholder taxes into account when the shareholders have different 
tax circumstances. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
190 At the corporate level, corporate managers might neglect shareholder taxes. At the mutual 
fund level, mutual fund managers might ignore fund investors' tax consequences. 
191 Some corporations operate as holding companies; special tax rules, however, ameliorate 
excess levels of tax on tiers of corporations. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.150-52 (1993) 
(implementing the consolidated return rules). 
192 Shifting to an entity-level tax would address the current difficulties facing corporate 
managers in juggling the diverse tax interests of different clients. Compare the discussion at 
notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra regarding the benefits of an entity-level corporate tax. 
Despite such potential benefit, this Article rejects an entity-level mutual fund tax for the reasons 
discussed in the text. In addition, as discussed infra in Section III.C, the proposed withholding 
tax should improve upon this difficulty, which currently inheres in the joint investment vehicle. 
193 Kanda & Levmore, supra note 93; Palmiter, supra note 61, at 1448 (showing that pass-
through tax treatment is needed for "financial viability [of] mutual funds as an investment 
instrument"). Cf. Rebecca Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World, 39 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965 (1988-89) (arguing that an entity level tax on liquid investments in 
real businesses is justified). Furthermore, limiting the proposal to a withholding tax avoids 
consideration of the more difficult issues that would accompany a new substantive tax on mutual 
funds. Compare the large body of tax scholarship critiquing the corporate-level tax. See, e.g., 
Colloquium on Corporate Integration, 47 TAX L. REV. 427 (1992). 
194 In contrast, the corporate tax can increase the tax burden on equity investments. This is 
most obvious when considering a tax-exempt or a low tax-bracket shareholder. The lack of any 
substantive tax increase also differentiates the proposed withholding tax from the current 
withholding obligation on U.S. mutual funds with foreign investors. The current withholding tax 
on foreign investors has been criticized since it increases the substantive tax liability (by taxing 
mutual fund distributions of stock gains that would be tax exempt if realized directly by the 
foreign investors). See, e.g., Yaron Reich, Taxing Foreign Investors' Portfolio Investments: 
Developments and Discontinuities, 79 TAX NOTES 1465, 1477-78 (1998). 
195 Taxpayers might pay taxes earlier under the withholding regime (at the time of the fund's 
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the withholding tax to fund investors should more than offset any sueh 
timing detriment to them. Fund investors should espeeially benefit from 
the expected increased focus on investors' taxes by fund managers, as 
described more fully below. 
The withholding regime appeals as a way to improve mutual fund 
managers' attention to their investors' taxes, despite the lack of any 
increased tax liability. In favorable contrast to the current status, higher 
investor taxes on a mutual fund's investments would directly reduce 
assets invested in the fimd. Consider the current lack of any such 
impact regarding the overwhelming majority of investors who choose 
automatic reinvestment of fund distributions in lieu of cash payments. 
Although investors owe tax on the reinvested distributions, the full 
pretax amount is automatically reinvested in the fund. Thus, a 
particular mutual fund's assets are not directly reduced by its investors 
taxes.This failure is unfortunate given the recognized incentive of 
fimd managers to maximize assets under management, which increase 
the management fee.i^^ Even if a tax-sensitive strategy by a particular 
fiind manager increased overall private investment funds,"® such 
distribution rather than possibly as late as April 15th of the following yeM). Any such^time valiw 
of money detriment should be slight, however, especially since large distributions from equity 
funds tend to occur at year-end and taxpayers who delay significant tax payments bey<md the tax 
year can face estimated tax penalties (even if payment is made by the following Apnl 15th) 
'06 In addition, the withholding tax could help fimd investors avoid potential estimated 
complexities and penalties upon the receipt of significant mutual fund distributions. 
Some fund investors nonetheless might oppose the withholding tax on grounds that it 
would increase their substantive tax liability. Such objections would either (i) be based on a 
mistaken understanding of the withholding tax, or (ii) highlight undesirable gaps m current t^ 
collections. In any event, the withholding tax is not a dramatic change since mutual already 
report each investor's share of dividends and inside capital gains to the IRS. M^hael J 
Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979) 
(explaining that information reporting, rather than withholding, is the pnmary defense against to 
avoidance/evasion). Mutual funds, rather than the investors, would have legitimate reasons for 
objecting due to the increased accountability. For a recent change that overcame objectmns from 
t h e  m u t u a l  f u n d  i n d u s t r y ,  s e e  t h e  n e w  d i s c l o s u r e  r u l e s  f o r  p r o x y  v o t i n g ,  ' °  
SEC Adopts New Rules for Lawyers and Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at CI ( [Mjutual 
fimd industry executives were critical of the S.E.C.'s move to require disclosure of proxy 
107 Over 90 percent of mumal fimd investors choose the dividend reinvestment option. See 
Robert Hershey, Your Taxes; For Careful Investors, Some Breaks on Capital Gams, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb 17, 2002 6 3, at 20. ^ . . 
'08 Such assets would be reduced only if the investor later liquidates a portion of his 
investment in the fimd to pay the corresponding taxes. Compare the discussion below of the 
withholding to, which would make this happen automatically. Mutual fimds currentty have 
some incentive to avoid taxable transactions since (i) a taxable transaction forces a distnbution 
and (ii) not all investors currently reinvest. The current pressure is very slight, however. As 
discussed above, the overwhelming majority of investors automatically reinvest. 
'09 Black, supra note 40, at 877 (stating that money managers have incentives to improve 
portfolio performance to increase asset-based management fees); Palmiter, supra note 61, at 1478 
(explaining that increasing fund assets is the primary incentive of fund managers, since fees are 
based on assets under management). 
"0 Reducing investors' taxes might not increase aggregate private investment, for example, 
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strategy would not necessarily increase assets invested in such 
manager's fund.'^' In fact, the strategy could potentially backfire given 
the flawed tendency of typical fund investors to focus on pre-tax, rather 
than after-tax, returns.Increasing after-tax returns at the expense of 
pretax returns could cause a fund to experience a decline in assets under 
management. 
In favorable contrast, the proposed withholding tax would 
automatically correlate a fund manager's tax-saving behavior and the 
fund's assets. A fund would have to withhold the appropriate tax 
percentage from the distribution of either corporate dividends or stock 
gains. Automatic reinvestment by a taxable investor therefore would 
occur at the lower after-tax amount rather than the full pretax amount. 
Thus, a fund that receives either corporate dividends or taxable stock 
gains would automatically experience an asset decline on taxable 
accounts which reinvest. The proposal therefore draws upon the noted 
incentive for fiind managers to maximize assets under management. 
For instance, fund managers would have an increased incentive to hold 
stocks which distribute through repurchases rather than dividends. By 
lowering the required withholding, repurchases would directly increase 
assets under management. 
investors might consume the savings. 
111 Compare Rock, supra note 61, at 473-75 (showing that peer rankings provide managers 
with incentives to take only those actions that further their competitive standing). 
112 Thus, typical statements regarding the manager incentive to improve performance can be 
understood as generally referencing pretax, rather than after-tax, performance. 
113 Assmne X stock has a lower expected pretax retimi than Y stock but a higher expected 
after-tax return for taxable investors (for example, it has a more tax-efficient distribution policy). 
Purchasing disproportionately more X stock than peer managers would generate a lower 
(expected) pretax retum despite the higher (expected) after-tax return for taxable investors. This 
would be a losing strategy for the fund manager to the extent taxable investors (incorrectly) 
choose funds based on pretax returns. (Under perfect conditions, the increased attractiveness to 
taxable investors would he appropriately balanced against the decreased attractiveness to tax-
deferred investors.) In sum, the tendency of even taxable investors to analyze on a pretax basis 
undercuts one source of potential discipline by mutual funds: market trades away from 
corporations with inefficient tax policies. The lack of direct connection between investors' taxes 
and fimd assets also undercuts voice monitoring, discussed supra notes 61-63. In the absence of 
agency costs, fimd managers would have an incentive to lobby corporate management for more 
tax-efficient distribution policies. Such voice monitoring on tax costs faces a problem similar to 
the trading discipline, however. Definite lobbying costs would have to he incurred in hopes that 
increased cash in investors' hands ultimately would be reinvested in the fimd. 
114 See discussion supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
U5 In addition to this stock trading discipline, fund managers would have an increased 
incentive to lobby management to substitute repurchases for dividends (voice discipline). For 
instance, successful lobbying efforts on share repurchases would generate a direct increase in 
assets under management, rather than the more speculative indirect possibility under the current 
structure. See discussion supra note 113. Note, however, that voice monitoring might be more 
difficult for shareholder tax issues than for more typical govemance issues. Collective action by 
institutions underlies the possibility of institutional voice. In contrast to typical govemance 
issues, the interests of institutional investors should diverge on shareholder taxes, based on their 
investors' profiles (assmning away the tax agency problems described above). Despite such 
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Importantly, as noted above, the proposal's impact extends beyond 
the dividend issue. Fund managers also would have an incentive to 
avoid the previously recognized tax slippage: frequent portfolio 
turnover without regard to tax consequences."® This incentive would 
result from the withholding tax's targeting of the general tax neglect by 
fund managers, without a specifie foeus on the dividend/repurchase 
issue. 
2. Comparison to SEC Disclosure Rules 
A comparison to the recent SEC tax disclosure rules furthers the 
appeal of the proposed withholding tax. The SEC recently promulgated 
rules requiring additional disclosure of mutual funds' after-tax returns in 
the hopes of eorreeting fund managers' tax neglect."^ This disclosure 
divergent interests, voice monitoring remains relevant in the tax area as well. First, to the extent 
the agency disconnect arises, institutional investors might falsely present a imified front on 
dividend tax costs (in other words, indifference to tax costs). Thus, at a minimum, correcting the 
agency disconnect could avoid a flawed collective message. In addition, there is the possibility 
that once mutual funds have management's ear, they can communicate their particular views, 
even where such views are not uniformly held by all institutional investors. Views contrast on 
whether institutional investors, especially those utilizing an indexed strategy, would undertake 
monitoring costs to increase (pretax) retums. Compare Rock, supra note 61, at 473-75 (sharing a 
pessimistic view on institutional shareholder monitoring), with Black, supra note 40, at 818 
(explaining that diversified institutional investors still have incentive to focus on general process 
and structure issues, rather than company-specific concems), 876 (showing that voice monitoring 
can be effective as long as some institutions become active and others vote carefully when called 
upon), 879-80 (stating that even index managers have incentives to improve performance—in 
other words, higher performance within an indexed category draws more overall funds to such 
category and/or some "index" managers achieve a high enough index correlation without holding 
all the stocks in the index). The tax problem analyzed in this Article is beyond such potential 
disconnect on pretax performance; in other words, an additional hurdle arises with regard to the 
more relevant after-tax return. 
As discussed supra note 65 and accompanying text, this accelerates taxable stock gains and 
possibly negates the favorable long-term capital gains rate. Mutual fund investors qualify for the 
capital gains rate only for investments held by the fund for more than one year (even if the 
investor has held his mutual fund interest beyond one year). In a certain sense, the neglect on 
dividends connects to the short-term trading problem. Short-term trading largely eliminates the 
tax advantages of repurchases, for example, any timing benefits on basis recovery are very short 
lived. The dividend neglect is a broader problem, however, since it can arise even where fund 
managers hold investments beyond one year. 
ll'' The proposal's impact on all fund investor taxes therefore distinguishes it from the recent 
legislative decision to tax dividends at the capital gains rate for the years 2003-07. See discussion 
supra note 4. The extended reach of this Article's proposal similarly distinguishes it from 
another way to address the market failure on dividend tax costs: imposition of a dividend 
withholding tax obligation at the corporate level, in other words, the initial payor of the dividend. 
A corporate dividend withholding tax also would address the mutual fund slippage on dividend 
tax costs. Unlike the proposed mutual fund withholding tax, however, the corporate dividend 
withholding tax would fail to address mutual fund tax agency costs more generally, for example, 
short-term trading by fund managers. There are, of course, other differences between this 
Article's proposal and the two altematives discussed in this footnote. 
See SEC Tax Disclosure, supra note 66 (explaining that tax disclosure "could ... caus[e] 
existing funds to alter their investment strategies to invest in a more tax-efficient manner."). 
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approach, however, still relies on individual fund investors to eliminate 
inefficient fund behavior. While appropriate disclosure might impose 
some additional discipline,''^ it is questionable whether enough mutual 
fund investors will act on the new information so as to correct the 
current market failure. Complexities surrounding the after-tax return 
calculation significantly hamper the disclosure approach. The after-tax 
return for each fund investor varies based on, inter alia, such 
individual's (i) combined tax rate (federal, state, and local), and (ii) 
eventual sale date for the investment in the mutual fund (due to the 
liquidation tax described above).'20 These individualized variants 
present a significant impediment to simple and meaningful disclosure of 
after-tax returns. 
The SEC rules deal with the tax rate issue by requiring calculations 
based on the highest federal rate.'^i The SEC rules deal with the 
liquidation tax by requiring two separate after-tax disclosures: one 
which ignores the liquidation tax and a second which applies the 
liquidation tax at the end of each disclosed investment period (in other 
words, one-, five- and ten-year investment periods). Despite sacrificing 
significant precision to reduce complexity,'22 the disclosure nonetheless 
still requires some sophistication in application.'22 In this regard, recall 
(i) the market's reliance on informed professional investors as to 
sophisticated corporate policies and (ii) the typical fund investor's lack 
of sophistication or size.'2'' Consider also the recognized failure of fund 
investors to discipline excess advisory fees.'25 
11® Disclosure might appear to lack any downside since increased awareness by investors of 
the tax consequences should not make funds less tax-conscious. The costs of additional 
disclostue, however, might outweigh the benefits, if any. See Michael Jensen & William 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 
J. FIN. ECON. 395 (1976) (stating that agency responses are justified only if savings exceed costs). 
See also SEC Tax Disclosure, supra note 66 (analyzing the costs of disclosure rules). 
DO As discussed supra note 86 and accompanying text, a partial or eomplete liquidation of the 
investment in the fund is a taxable event for fund investors. Investors report gain equal to the 
excess of (i) the liquidation proceeds over (ii) their "basis" in the liquidated shares (in other 
words, purehase price). 
D1 No additional adjustment is made for state and loeal taxes. SEC Tax Disclosure, supra 
note 66. 
D2 For example, the SEC declined to provide a range of after-tax retums based on different tax 
rates. Id. 
D3 Consider, for example, the provision of dueling after-tax calculations, one of whieh 
completely ignores the liquidation tax. 
D4 As discussed supra note 80 and accompanying text, even savvy investors with relatively 
little at stake might neglect to undertake the time-consuming sophisticated tax analysis out of 
rational apathy. 
D5 See Palmiter, supra note 61, at 1463, 1471-72, 1490-91 (explaining that judicial review of 
advisory fees "is meant as an antidote to . . . market failtire ... of widespread investor 
insensitivity to the level and nature of advisory fees."). The "imagined story of market 
responsiveness, though attractive, suffers at a number of levels. Recent studies and investor 
behavior suggests that fund investors' sensitivity to fund performance is ... shallow.... Studies 
continue to confirm that mutual fund investors systematically fail to discipline underperforming 
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Separately, even if fund investors would eliminate the tax 
inefficiency with more knowledge, it is unclear whether the SEC rules 
will effectively deliver such information. In addition to the difficulties 
discussed above, the SEC rules generally require disclosure of after-tax 
returns in the mutual fund prospectus. The rules have been cntiqued on 
grounds that investors do not read prospectuses even at onginal 
investment.Investors are even more unlikely to read a prospectus 
subsequent to the initial investment. In particular, consider the 
significant amounts already invested with mutual fund companies. The 
withholding tax therefore might further the tax disclosure goal even 
though disclosure is not its primary objective. Each distribution 
statement would show the pretax distribution less the actual taxes 
withheld. 
Finally, even if the new disclosure rules prompt investors to shun 
tax-insensitive funds, an additional obstacle arises for certain existing 
fund accounts: the tax "lock-in" effect. As noted above, fund investors 
must pay a liquidation tax when they sell fund shares for more than their 
purchase price. Thus, the potential new tax-sawy investor could face a 
difficult decision whether to sell an existing tax-insensitive account. 
The suggested withholding tax addresses this concern since, again, it 
places only secondary reliance on disclosure. 
funds or monitor excessive advisory fees." W. r ocv 
126 Mutual Fund Regulation in the Next Millenium Symposium, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 403, 
480 (2001) (concluding that investors do not read prospectuses, they read ads). 
127 One advantage over the SEC tax disclosure rules is that the witliheld tax amount would be 
based on the taxpayer's particular tax rate rather than the one rate assumed for all. See discussion 
supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. In addition, taxpayers currently receive year-en 
statements of their taxable income from the fiind, but not the actual tax liability (in other words, 
taxable income times applicable tax rate). The proposed withholding regime, o" » ^^r basis, 
would pull together in one document their pretax retums and their estimated tax liability from the 
fund. On the other hand, the SEC disclosure approach provides an after-tax companson between 
funds before the time of original investment. Note that the withholding tax should provide a 
stronger overall response than the SEC rules even if its disclosure component is weaker (m other 
words unlike the disclosure approach, the withholding tax better aligns the fimd manager and 
investor interests, as diseussed supra notes 104-17 and accompanying text). urt eimore, 
especially since the SEC rules are already in effect, the withholding tax could be adopted in 
addition to the disclosure rules. 
128 That is selling for reinvestment in a more tax-sensitive account could increase the 
year's tax bill. This would not be a problem to the extent the tax-inefficient fund manager had 
already triggered the tax bill on all of the fund s gains. . • r- ». 
129 In addition, the withholding tax would avoid the occasional surprise of a significMt tax 
payment owed at year end due to taxable income from certain funds. See SEC Tax Disclosure, 
supra note 66 ("tax consequences of distributions are a particular source of su^nse to many 
investors when they discover that they can owe substantial taxes ... unrelated to the performance 
of the fund. Even if the value of a fund has declined during the year, a shareholder can owe toes 
on capital gains distributions if the portfolio manager sold some of the fund's underlying portfoho 
securities at a gain."). As discussed supra notes 105-06 and aceompanying text this needs to be 
balanced against a possible time value of money detriment to the investor. As discussed therein, 
however, the withholding on mutual fund distributions could help deal with estimated tax 
complexities and penalties as well. 
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In sum, the proposed withholding tax appeals since it uniquely 
addresses the tax agency problem from both the agent and principal 
sides. First, the agents would have a greater incentive to pursue the 
after-tax interests of their principals. Second, the principals would have 
more information regarding the performance of their agents. 
C. Possible Concerns Under the Withholding Tax 
This Section addresses three possible concerns raised by the 
proposed withholding tax.'^o First, agency responses should be 
implemented only if the benefits outweigh the costs.The 
administrative costs of the new withholding regime appear reasonable in 
light of the benefits described above. In particular, mutual funds 
already must report to the government each fund investor's allocable 
share of corporate dividends and capital gains. 
Second, concern might arise that funds would limit sales of 
appreciated assets to avoid the decline in assets under management. 
Notwithstanding legitimate objections to such tax distortion 
generally, 133 this is the tax regime which applies to investors. Thus, this 
possible concern further supports the withholding tax by demonstrating 
the better alignment of the interests of mutual fund managers and their 
investors. Similar to a direct investment by an individual taxpayer, 
funds would have an incentive to balance the pretax merits of a 
continued investment against the tax cost of the sale.i^i Managers 
would not have an incentive to retain appreciated stock regardless of its 
pretax merits. A subsequent decline in value would directly reduce 
assets under management, with possible additional indirect reductions 
due to a poor pretax investment record. 
Finally, concern might arise that mutual fund managers would 
'30 See discussion supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (responding to the additional 
concem that the withholding tax might unduly discourage use of the mutual fund). 
'31 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 119. 
'32 fee discussion note 90. 
'33 See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains 
Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319(1993) (discussing the tax-induced "lock-in" problem). 
'34 Some imperfections remain under the suggested withholding tax; for example, fund 
managers would not be able to determine the exact deferral value for each investor. As discussed 
supra note 86 and accompanying text, any deferred taxes are triggered when the investor 
liquidates the fund investment. Thus the value of deferral depends, in part, on each investor's 
expected holding period in the fund. Despite lacking complete precision, the suggested approach 
nonetheless would be a meaningful improvement over the current general tax neglect by fund 
managers. For instance, fund managers could assume a holding period for investors based on 
prior experience. Also, uncertainty as to the timing of the liquidation tax should be more 
problematic under the SEC disclosure approach given the lack of sophistication and/or size of the 
typical fimd investor. See also discussion infra note 139 (regarding investors in different tax 
brackets). 
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have difficulty in reconciling the different tax needs of their investors. 
As discussed above, a good percentage of assets under mutual fund 
m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  m a d e  t h r o u g h  t a x - d e f e r r e d  r e t i r e m e n t  p l a n s . T h e  
manager of a mutual fund with taxable and tax-deferred investors would 
face a conflict to the extent the preferred strategy varied with tax status. 
The proposed withholding tax, however, is not responsible for such 
conflict, as it currently exists. Difficulties in balancing the interests of 
different principals currently inhere in the joint investment vehicle. 
Encouraging mutual fund managers to juggle investors' varying tax 
interests is preferable to the current favoring of the tax-deferred 
group.The significance of the potential tax savings for the taxable 
group reinforces the unsatisfactory nature of the current state. 
Furthermore, the proposal might accelerate the separation of 
taxable and tax-deferred investors, assuming the efficiency of such 
separation.'38 One potential result of the new tax incentives is that some 
funds may subdivide into one fund for taxable investors and a second 
for tax-deferred investors.Such separation would decrease the 
managerial burden in reconciling investors' disparate tax profiles.''"' 
•35 See discussion supra note 73 (discussing how qualified retirement funds are tax indifferent 
for purposes of this analysis). See discussion supra note 74 (providing the breakdown between 
tax-deferred and taxable accoimts). 
'36 See discussion supra note 76 (discussing how taxable investors are under-represented while 
pension funds represent tax-deferred shareholders). 
Difficulties in juggling interests occin at the corporate level, as well. See Edward S. 
Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 49 
EMORY L.J. 1085 (2000) (analyzing and advocating consideration of non-shareholder 
constituency groups); Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate 
Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 175 
(explaining that a juggling issue arises even if corporate managers take into account only 
shareholders since shareholder interests can diverge). 
•37 Again, the potential tax savings include the previously-recognized short-term trading 
problem. 
•38 Some funds currently market themselves to taxable investors. Nonetheless, many taxable 
investors continue to hold shares in funds which insufficiently weigh the taxes of their taxable 
investors. See discussion supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. See also infra note 141 
(discussing the desirability of separate funds for taxable and tax-deferred investors). 
•39 For instance, a separation into taxable and tax-deferred funds might benefit mutual fund 
companies since, for example, only the tax-deferred fund would acquire investments with 
expected favorable pretax returns but unfavorable afler-tax retiuns (and vice versa). In making 
the decision whether to separate, the mutual fund company would balance any offsetting costs 
etc. from such separation. Such private cost/benefit analysis might be one reason to favor the 
suggested withholding tax over a government-mandated separation of funds into taxable and tax-
deferred groups. The govemment-mandated separation approach also raises other concerns. For 
instance, absent an increased incentive to heed investors' taxes, managers of taxable funds still 
might inadequately weigh investors' taxes. Also, a separation into taxable and tax-deferred 
groups arguably oversimplifies the issue. In particular, the tax cost to a particular investors varies 
even within the taxable group. At the extreme, the tax desires of a low-bracket taxable investor 
could be closer to a tax-deferred investor than a high-bracket investor. In favorable contrast, the 
proposed withholding tax addresses the noted market failure—mutual fund agency tax costs—and 
then allows the efficient outcome to develop in the marketplace. 
•40 Even a separation into taxable and tax-deferred funds would not eliminate potential tax 
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Even in the absence of such separation, the proposed withholding tax 
would improve the status quo on this issue for the reasons discussed 
above^"*' 
CONCLUSION 
The marketplace generally will not eliminate inefficient policies 
neglected by key institutional players. This Article describes one such 
market failure that explains, in part, the dividend puzzle. This market 
failure results fi-om the general disregard by mutual fund managers of 
their investors' taxes. The recommended new withholding tax on 
mutual funds targets this agency problem. This Article's proposed 
remedy implicitly realigns the tax interests of mutual fund managers 
and their investors. Ceteris paribus, lower taxes would increase both 
the fund manager's fee and investors' after-tax returns. Accordingly, 
the proposal favorably extends beyond dividend taxes to address other 
fund investor taxes as well, such as the previously-recognized problem 
of short-term trading by fund managers. 
The proposed withholding tax also provides a stronger response to 
the mutual fund tax agency problem than the recent SEC tax disclosure 
rules. The SEC rules rely solely on the questionable ability of fund 
investors to fully discipline tax-inefficient fund managers. In favorable 
contrast, the proposed withholding tax attacks the agency problem from 
the perspective of the fund manager "agents" as well.'''^ As described 
above, the withholding tax would provide such agents with a significant 
new incentive to follow their principals' interests. 
conflicts between different investors. The taxable investor group is heterogeneous: The best 
afler-tax investment decision could vary for different taxable investors, based on marginal tax 
rates and/or the liquidation date of the fund investment. See discussion supra notes 134 and 139. 
'4' Imposing a single entity-level tax on mutual funds themselves (and eliminating the tax on 
investors) would remove the tax balancing issue. As discussed supra note 102 and accompanying 
text however, such entity-level tax is unacceptable for other reasons. 
•''2 Like the SEC approach, the proposed withholding tax also would provide more tax-related 
information to the investor. Accordingly, the withholding tax also approaches the problem from 
the principal perspective; in other words, such information might encourage more 
investor/principals to discipline tax-inefficient manager/agents. As discussed above, however, 
there are serious impediments to successful monitoring of agents by principals in the mutual fund 
context. 
